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This paper examines an entrepreneur-investor relationship in a stylized model where
(i) investment needs are unknown ex ante and arise sequentially, (ii) a major decision
must be reached at a maturity stage, (iii) this decision depends on entrepreneur’s
private information, observable by the investor at some cost. The two partners agree
on a corporate governance system which includes a split of future cash-ﬂows and an
allocation of control on the above decision contingently on investment. It turns out
that control is assigned to the entrepreneur for low investment levels and then switches
to the investor when investment exceeds a threshold.
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11 Introduction
In their survey article, Shleifer and Vishny deﬁne corporate governance as “the ways in
which suppliers of ﬁnance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their
investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In practice, a governance system assigns speciﬁc
rights and obligations among corporate shareholders and managers. Among these rights,
cash-ﬂow rights (a divide of cash ﬂows) and control rights (the rights to make decisions) are
certainly the most important ones. A good governance structure should allocate cash ﬂow
and control rights in a way to create the highest return from investment.
This paper focusses on the governance structure of start-ups ﬁrms. It models the following
salient features of the venture capital industry. First, the funded projects are risky and long
terms. Second, investment needs arrive over time so that the infusion of capital occurs in
stages. Third, the entrepreneur1 who runs the ﬁrm has more information (e.g. about the
outcome of R&D) than her ﬁnancial partner. The investor is able to gather information
by exerting costless supervision/management activities. Fourth, at the maturity stage of
the project, some strategic decisions (e.g. how to patent and licence, to form technological
alliances) have to be made. Control rights are thus deﬁned as the rights to select these
decisions.
The framework is the one, for instance, of a biotech start-up. The entrepreneur is then
a scientist who has an idea about how to obtain a new plant or medicine. She needs funds
to cover the cost of R&D. At this stage, there is still high uncertainty about the return of
R&D activities. Then, after several experimentations, the scientist acquires a more accurate
idea on the real cost of making this innovation reality. During the R&D process, an investor
provide the scientist with funds. The scientist accumulates information about the new plant
or medicine (its eﬃcient, eﬀects on human health and on the environment, its patentability)
which are crucial for future decisions at development and marketing stages. By being actively
involved into management, the investor becomes better informed and, therefore, knows better
what to do. However, investing himself into management has an opportunity cost for the
investor as he devotes less time to other projects.
In this asymmetric information framework, control is certainly linked with superior infor-
mation. Since the entrepreneur is the only one to know (at no cost) what decision maximizes
the return of the venture, it is eﬃcient to assign her control if she indeed undertakes it. She
does select the right decision if she has incentives to do so, that is, if the division of cash-ﬂows
1The entrepreneur (investor) will be referred as “she” (“he”).
2provides her with such incentives. An eﬃcient corporate governance structure assigns control
rights to the entrepreneur, and cash-ﬂow rights in a way to provide her with incentives to
maximize returns.
Such a governance structure leaves an informational rent to the entrepreneur. It is
therefore feasible if, after paying for this rent, the investor still gets an expected return
on investment.2 Otherwise, i.e. when the expected return is too low to include both the
entrepreneur’s informational rent and the investor’s opportunity cost, the two partners assign
control to the investor. The investor exerts costly management activities which are dead-
weight losses. The ﬁnal outcome is then second-best. Cash-ﬂow rights can be designed to
provide the investor with incentives to undertake the right decisions (i.e. to maximize the
project return), because a wrong decision might leads to bankruptcy and, therefore, very
low repayments to the investor.
Thus, in the present framework, it turns out that control is correlated with expected
returns. When high enough, control is assigned to the entrepreneur and the governance
structure implements the ﬁrst-best outcome. Otherwise, control is assigned to the investor
and the governance structure implements a second-best outcome.
In real-world venture capital ﬁnance, a project return is very uncertain at the beginning
of the contracting relationship but becomes more precise years after years once the ﬁrm has
started performing R&D. During this R&D stage, the start-up ﬁrm makes negative proﬁts
so that its activities are founded by the investor. The infusion of capital arises sequentially
through successive ﬁnancing rounds during which investment needs are revealed. Long before
having a return on investment, the investor gets a better idea about the real cost of the
project and, thus, its return.
In the model, the contracting partners take advantage of this sequential arrival of in-
formation by assigning control contingently on investment. Higher ﬁnancial needs means
a more costly project and, therefore, a lower return on investment. As long as investment
is low (and therefore the return is high in expectation), the entrepreneur retains control.
However, once investment exceeds a threshold, control rights shift to the investor.
These results are consistent with empirical evidences on venture capital ﬁnance and tech-
nological alliances. According to Gompers and Lerner (1996) and Sahlman (1990), start-ups
ﬁnanced by venture-capital funds use prevalently convertible securities and covenants, which
2In other words, if the project expected return exceed the informational rent plus the opportunity cost
of investment.
3leave to the investor an option to shift control and cash-ﬂow rights after some revelation of
information related to ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance. Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2000) pointed
out that the distinguishing feature of venture-capital ﬁnancing is to assign control rights (vot-
ing rights, board rights, liquidation rights) and cash-ﬂow rights separately and contingently
on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance (e.g. shareholder’s ﬁnancial supply, sales or explicit ob-
jectives).3 In their detailed empirical investigation, they found that control and cash-ﬂow
rights are allocated such that if “the ﬁrm performs poorly, the venture capitalists obtain full
control. As performance improves, the entrepreneur retains/obtains more control rights. If
the ﬁrm perform very well, the [venture capitalists] retain their cash ﬂow rights, but relin-
quish most of their control and liquidation rights”. In addition, they report that “founder’s
cash-ﬂow, voting and board rights decline over ﬁnancing rounds while [venture capitalist]
rights increase”.4 This suggests that, when not explicit, this shift of control contingent on
investment is implicit: The two contracting partners can reasonably expect a transfer of
control from the founder to the venture-capitalists when ﬁnancial supply increases.
Lerner and Merges (1998) provide similarly evidences in technological alliances between
biotech and pharmaceutical companies. These alliances are contracts signed to develop,
produce and sell new medicines. Drug companies provide to biotech ﬁrms with ﬁnancial
resources5 to cover their development costs and with support at the manufacturing and
selling stages. Remarkably, these deals specify explicitly the allocation of control rights in
several tasks (e.g. management of clinical trial, manufacture of ﬁnal product, marketing,
right to expand the alliance) which seems to be, according to the authors, “a central issue”
during the negotiations. The authors found strong evidences that the allocation of control
rights depends mainly on the ﬁnancial condition of the biotech ﬁrm. Biotech ﬁrms in bad
ﬁnancial condition tend to retain less control rights; thereby suggesting that biotech ﬁrms’
control is negatively correlated with drug companies’ investment.
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 links the paper with the literature. Section
3 introduces the model. In Section 4, I ﬁnd out the equilibrium governance system. For
this purpose, I examine successively the governance system with the entrepreneur in control
3“The distinguishing feature characteristic of venture capital ﬁnancing is that they allow [venture capital-
ists] to separately allocate cash-ﬂow rights, voting rights, board rights, liquidation rights and other control
rights.”....“Cash-ﬂow rights, voting rights, control rights and future ﬁnancing are frequently contingent on
observable measures of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial performance.” Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2000).
4Obviously, more rounds means an increase of ﬁnancial supply.
5According to Lerner and Merges (1998) ”[i]n the biotechnological industry, ... alliances with pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms have become in recent years the single largest source of ﬁnancing for biotech ﬁrms”.
4(Section 4.1), and with the investor in control (Section 4.2). I then derive the best governance
system. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
Most of the literature addressing the issue of control in corporate governance relies on the
assumption of contractual incompleteness. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), a branch
of this literature focusses on (non-contractible) relation-speciﬁc investments. Cash-ﬂow and
control rights are both associated with ownership which is allocated in such a way to minimize
the under-investment of each party. Recent papers (Casamatta, 2003, De Bettignies, 2003,
N¨ oldeke and Schmidt, 1998, Renucci, 2001, Repullo and Suarez, 2004, Schmidt, 2003) show
that a transfer of ownership from one partner to another during the contracting relationship
mitigates, or even alleviates (N¨ oldeke and Schmidt, 1998), the under-investment problem.6
Also build on Grossman-Hart is Aghion and Tirole (1997)’s theory of real and formal
control (applied to venture-capital ﬁnance by Cestone, 2002). In their model, the relation-
speciﬁc investments are investments in information gathering. Information is then useful to
select projects at a last decision-making stage. Unlike in Grossman-Hart, their model allows
separate allocation of control rights (the right to select decisions) and cash-ﬂow rights. Still,
the governance structure is designed to mitigate the under-investment problem in information
gathering.
Another branch of the incomplete contract literature is based on the assumption that
the entrepreneur enjoys private and non-contractible beneﬁts by misbehaving, i.e. selecting
ineﬃcient decisions (Aghion and Bolton, 1992, Dessein 2003, Kirilenko, 2001, Tirole, 2001).
For instance, founders might enjoy private beneﬁt when running a ﬁrm which makes him
reluctant to liquidate (Bergl¨ of, 1994) and/or to be replaced by professional managers (Hell-
mann, 1998) even if it is optimal to do so. The governance structure must prevent them to
select these ineﬃcient decisions. In the present model, there is no such exogeneous private
beneﬁt. Moreover, any decision is eﬃcient in at least one situation/state of nature. Yet, the
entrepreneur can take advantage of asymmetric information to undertake a decision which
maximizes her own payoﬀ (i.e. her share of the cash-ﬂows) but not the project return. Doing
so, she enjoys beneﬁt which indeed depends on the distribution of cash-ﬂows. In this sense,
6To be precise, some of these papers (e.g. Casamatta, 2003, Repullo and Suarez, 2004) model non-
contractible speciﬁc investments as non-observable eﬀorts, thereby relying on a double moral-hazard problem
but not imposing contractual incompleteness. The driving of the two approach are simmilar.
5the present model endogenizes the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt from misbehaving. The
governance structure is designed to alleviate such beneﬁt whenever possible.7
The present paper deviates from the traditional incomplete contract approach in several
features. First, the governance structure can be made contingent to any useful common
information, including investment and decisions.8 It also allow to separate control to cash-
ﬂow rights. It is therefore more suitable to explain explicit contingencies in real-word start-
up governance structures as documented by Lerner and Merges (1998) and Kaplan and
Str¨ omberg (2000).9 Second, the model does not focus on a moral hazard problem with non-
observable and/or non-contractible actions (e.g. relation-speciﬁc investment or eﬀort). In
contrast, here, all actions are observable and contractible. Furthermore, they can be selected
by any of the two partner, control deﬁning who selects actions. The model is based on a
hidden information game: The two partners contract with symmetric information but the
entrepreneur becomes better informed later.10
Finally, I should add that my approach borrows from the state veriﬁcation model of
the ﬁnancial contracting literature (Townsend, 1979, Gale and Hellwig, 1985, Lacker and
Weinberg, 1989), which have endogenized debt contracts. Likewise, the investor can observe
entrepreneur’s information at a cost. However, to address the issue of control, I introduce a
decision stage which provides a rational for investors’ involvement into the management of
the ﬁrm and, therefore, for more complex ﬁnancial contracts than standard debt.
3 The model
Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur (or a start up ﬁrm, referred as ”she”) E who has a
project but lacks of ﬁnancial means. She contracts with a risk-neutral ﬁnancier F (refereed
7This will be indeed the case in the model when the project’s expected return is high enough. Otherwise,
the investor has no choice but to manage the project himself.
8Notice the contract is not made contingent to future proﬁts because they remain entrepreneur’s private
information (if the investor is not involved in management).
9Remarkably, in their attempt to rationalize real-word venture capital contracts with contract theory,
Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2000) write ”the allocation of control rights between [Venture capitalists] and the
entrepreneur is a central feature of the ﬁnancial contracts. This strongly suggests that despite the prevalence
of contingent contracting, contracts are inherently incomplete.” This paper posits a theory which explain
both the prevalence of contingent contracts and the importance of the allocation of control rights between
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
10Although, in reality, the entrepreneur might also have private information at the contracting stage, I
assume symmetric information to focus on the eﬀect of the arrival of information during the relationship.
6as ”he”) for ﬁnancial support. At this stage, the contracting partners, E and F, do not know
the total amount required I to complete the project. They contract on a seed investment
normalized to 0. Then, after starting the project, they reach an expansion stage, which
requires an expansion investment I. This expansion investment is unknown before starting
the project and, therefore, the total investment level I is learnt only after the contracting
stage. Before that, it is common knowledge that I is a random variable with support
I = [I; ¯ I], distribution f and cumulative F. The projet fails if I is not invested. If I
is invested, the project yields a cash-ﬂow or proﬁt ¼(x;µ) where x is a strategic decision
and µ is a random variable describing the “state of nature”. µ takes value g, for “good”
state of nature (respectively, b for ”bad” state of nature), with probability pg (respectively
pb = 1 ¡ pg). It is assumed that cash-ﬂows are always higher in the good state of nature g
than in the bad state: ¼(x;g) > ¼(x;b) for any x. For simplicity, we assume that x is binary
decision taking values fxb;xgg, where xµ = Argmaxx¼(x;µ).11 The return of the project
with decision x in state µ and investment needs I is ¼(x;µ) ¡ I.
Information. The parameter µ is E’s private information. It can be observed by F by
performing costly management activities which include active presence on the board, third
party expertise, auditing, at a cost ° > 0.12
For concreteness, think the entrepreneur as an innovator who needs funds to perform
research, develop and then market an innovation. Ex ante, she does not know for sure the
cost and outcome of the R&D process. Ex post, she might have private information about
it (e.g. the market value of the innovation), which can be high (µ = g) or low (µ = b). This
information is crucial for major decisions (e.g. to form alliances or merge, submit a patent,
sell licences, develop or not a project), which are summarized by the variable x.
The investment level I 2 I is common knowledge. Both the loan and the actions are
observable and can be contracted upon.13
Contract. The two partner sign ex ante a contract specifying:
² The investment I provided by F.
11Our assumptions imply ¼(xg;g) > ¼(xb;b), ¼(xg;g) > ¼(xb;g) and ¼(xb;b) > ¼(xg;b).
12This cost can be seen as the cost of duplicating management activities (assuming that E manages also
the ﬁrm anyway) or to supervise E’s activities. It is assume strictly positive but not ”too high” to exclude
uninteresting pooling equilibria; formally ° < ¼(xb;g) ¡ ¼(xb;b).
13Notice that the informational structure implies that F cannot observe the proﬁt if he has not observed
µ (i.e. if he has not spend °). Therefore, the contract cannot be contingent on proﬁts.
7² An allocation of authority or control rights C(I) 2 fE;Fg contingently on investment
I.
² A repayment scheme, i.e. F’s cash-ﬂow rights,14 R(x;I) contingently on decision x
and investment I.
Game. E makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to F. F’s outside option is (1 + r)I, where
r > 0 is opportunity cost of capital (e.g. the market interest rate). It is assumed that E
is protected by limited liability, which implies that her payoﬀ cannot be negative, whereas
F has ”deep pocket” but he can decide to stop investing anytime (or, equivalently, cannot
commit not to do so in the contract).
The two players play the following game:
1. E proposes a contract/governance system fR(xµ;I);C(I)gµ=b;g;I2I to F who accepts or
refuses.
2. I is publicly observed.
3. F continues or stops ﬁnancing the project.
4. F chooses to spend ° or not.
5. Player C(I) chooses an action xµ.
6. Payments are made as prescribed by the contract.
I will focus on the equilibrium incentive contracts/governance systems of the above game,
i.e. the contracts/governance systems which provide to the players with incentives to maxi-
mize the return of the project in a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
4 The corporate governance system
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium governance system. Since there is a cost for F
to gather E’s information, the two partners would avoid this ineﬃciency loss by assigning
control to E. I therefore begin by focusing on a governance structure with E in control.
First, I characterize the split of cash-ﬂows under E’s control. Second, I establish conditions
14E’s cash-ﬂow rights are ¼(x;µ) ¡ R(x;I).
8on investment I for which such a governance structure is feasible. Thirdly, I ﬁnd out the
split of cash-ﬂows under F’s control. Lastly, I describe the equilibrium governance structure.
4.1 Entrepreneur in control
Under E’s control, the repayment scheme fR(xµ;I)gµ=b;g;I2I maximizes E’s expected payoﬀ
(over µ and I) Eµ;I[¼(xµ;µ) ¡ R(xµ;I)] subject to the following constraints for every µ;µ0 =
b;g;µ 6= µ0 and I 2 I:
Eµ[R(xµ;I)] ¸ (1 + r)I IR(I)
¼(xµ;µ) ¡ R(xµ;I) ¸ 0 LL(µ)
¼(xµ;µ) ¡ R(xµ;I) ¸ ¼(xµ0;µ) ¡ R(xµ0;I) ICE(µ)
The ﬁrst constraint IR(I) is F’s participation constraint, often called individual-rationality
constraint, stipulating that F’s expected payoﬀ (over µ) from investing in the project com-
pensates the opportunity cost of investment. The second set of constraints LL(b) and LL(g)
are E’s limited liability constraints, or ex-post participation constraints, stipulating that E’s
payoﬀ cannot be negative in every state of nature µ 2 fb;gg. The last two constraints ICE(b)
and ICE(g) are E’s incentive compatibility constraints stipulating that E has incentive to
choose the right decision (i.e. the decision that maximizes cash-ﬂows) in every state of nature
µ 2 fb;gg.
In the above program, F’s participation constraint IR(I) is binding. In addition, both
LL(b) and IC(g) satisﬁed imply ¼(xg;g)¡R(xg) ¸ ¼(xb;g)¡¼(xb;b) > 0. Therefore, LL(g)
holds. Thus the set of constraints reduces to, for every I 2 I,
Eµ[R(xµ;I)] = (1 + r)I IR(I)
R(xb;I) · ¼(xb;b) LLE(b)
R(xg;I) · R(xb;I) + [¼(xg;g) ¡ ¼(xb;g)] ICE(g)
R(xg;I) ¸ R(xb;I) ¡ [¼(xb;b) ¡ ¼(xg;b)] ICE(b)












For any I > I, F’s participation constraint IR(I) is a line parallel to and above IR(I).
Since E’s indiﬀerence curves are parallels to F’s participation constraints, the equilibrium
repayments are on the part of the line IR(I) located between the lines representing the other
constraints in the shaded area . Both players are indiﬀerent among all these repayments
schemes. They include debt repayments R(xg;I) = R(xb;I) = (1+r)I when (1+r)I is low
enough, that is when (1 + r)I · ¼(xb;b). As (1 + r)I increases IR(I) moves upward with
the same slope. When (1 + r)I > Π(xb;b), the repayments to F when xg is implemented is
higher. The highest level that can be invested under E’s authority, denoted ˜ I, imposes unique
repayments located at A in Figure 1. At this point, ICE(g) and LL(b) are both binding,
therefore R(xb;I) = ¼(xb;b) and R(xg;I) = ¼(xg;g) ¡ ∆¼(xb), with ∆¼(xµ) ´ ¼(xµ;g) ¡
¼(xµ;b). F’s participation constraint binding writes Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)]¡pg∆¼(xb) = (1+r)˜ I. The




(Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] ¡ pg∆¼(xb)): (1)
10The set of equilibrium repayments for every I 2 [I; ˜ I] is represented by the shaded area
in Figure 1. For investment levels higher that ˜ I, the project cannot be ﬁnanced under E’s
control. We now investigate wether it can be ﬁnanced with F in control.
4.2 Financier in control
Under F’s control, F observes µ by being actively involved into day-to-day management,
which means incurring the cost °. However, he must have incentive to i) exert management
costs °, ii) implement the right decision in the right state of nature.15 Notice that, due to
E’s limited liability, F cannot ask for more than E’s proﬁt in a given state for any decision
implemented. That means, for instance, that if the state of nature is b, and F implement xg,
he cannot ask for more than ¼(xg;b). In this case, F gets the minimal value among R(xg;I)
and ¼(xg;b).
Under F’s control, the equilibrium repayments fR(xµ;I)gµ=b;g;I2(˜ I;¯ I] must satisfy the
following constraints for µ = b;g; ˜ I < I · ¯ I,
Eµ[R(xµ;I)] ¡ ° = (1 + r)I IR°(I)
¼(xµ;µ) ¡ R(xµ;I) ¸ 0 LL(µ)
Eµ[R(xµ;I)] ¡ ° ¸ pgR(xg;I) + pb minfR(xg;I);¼(xg;b)g IC
°
F(g)
Eµ[R(xµ;I)] ¡ ° ¸ pg minfR(xb;I);¼(xb;g)g + pbR(xb;I) IC
°
F(b)
R(xg;I) ¸ minfR(xb;I);¼(xb;g)g ICF(g)
R(xb;I) ¸ minfR(xg;I);¼(xg;b)g ICF(b)
The ﬁrst constraint IR°(I) are F’s binding participation constraints taking into account than
F has to spend °. The second set of constraints LL(b) and LL(g) are E’s limited liability




F(b) are F’s incentive-compatible
constraints to exert costly management activities. Constraint IC
°
F(µ) stipulates that F is
better oﬀ if he spends ° and undertakes the right decision rather than if he always chooses
xµ for every xµ 2 fxb;xgg. The last two constraints ICF(g) and ICF(b) are F’s incentive-
compatibility constraints on decisions. Constraint ICF(µ) stipulates that, after observing
15Notice that, when F knows µ, the contract or governance structure can be make contingent on proﬁts
(or on µ) in addition to decisions. Then F can be disciplined by imposing very high ﬁnes when decisions does
not match with corresponding proﬁts. I will show that adding such contingencies is useless because, without
them, the governance structure provides to F with such incentives: The incentive-compatible constraints on
decisions are not binding.
11the state of nature µ, F has incentive to choose the decision that maximizes the project
surplus.




F(b) simplify to, respectively, R(xb;I) ¸ °
pb +
minfR(xg;I);¼(xg;b)g and R(xg;I) ¸ °
pg + minfR(xb;I);¼(xb;g)g. These constraints are
more stringent that the other incentive constraints ICF(g) and ICF(b), as well as the limited
liability constraint LL(b), which therefore hold. The remaining constraints are:
Eµ[R(xµ;I)] ¡ ° = (1 + r)I IR°(I)
¼(xg;µ) ¡ R(xg;I) ¸ 0 LL(g)
R(xb;I) ¸ °




pg + minfR(xb;I);¼(xb;g)g IC
°
F(b)




















As before, the equilibrium repayments are located at F’s participation constraint, here
IR°(I), for any I 2 (˜ I; ¯ I] within the bounds deﬁned by the above constraints. They are on
the lines parallel to and upward IR°(˜ I) in the shaded area. They are such that ¼(xg;g) ¸
R(xg;I) > R(xb;I) ¸ ¼(xb;b). Such repayments under F’s control correspond, for instance,
to a governance system where F has a majority share of the ﬁrm (with majority voting rules,
board seats and cash-ﬂow rights). The higher investment level that can be accepted by F





The entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ is Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] ¡ ° ¡ (1 + r)I.16
16The dead-weight loss ° is represented by the distance between the shaded line crossing A and the
13To sum up, since there is a cost ° for F to gather E’s information, the partnership
would avoid this ineﬃciency loss whenever it is possible that is when I · ˜ I. When I > ˜ I,
an incentive contract is not feasible because the informational rent left to E exceeds the
project expected return. Hence, the contract calls for F’s control and, therefore, some costly
management. Such a contract is feasible as long as I · Imax. The main results are enunciated
in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 The governance system assigns control and cash-ﬂows contingently on in-
vestment supply in the following way.
² For very low investment levels17 I · 1
1+r¼(xb;b), E has control rights and repayments
to F can be made constant like in a standard debt contract.
² For low investment levels I 2 [ 1
1+r¼(xb;b); ˜ I], E has control rights and both E and F
get more cash-ﬂow with higher proﬁt.
² For high investment supply I 2 (˜ I;Imax], F has control as well as more cash-ﬂow with
higher proﬁt.
In this entrepreneur-investor relationship, the partners share the expected return of the
project Eµ;I[¼(xµ;µ) ¡ I]. In addition to F’s opportunity cost rI, this return must cover
E’s informational rent ∆¼(xb) if E has control, or, F’s management cost ° if F has control.
To avoid the loss °, the governance system assigns control to E whenever possible, that is,
when the project expected return exceeds the sum of F’s opportunity cost of investment
and E’s informational rent. Formally, when Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] ¡ I ¸ rI + ∆¼(xb), which leads to
I · ˜ I. Otherwise, the governance structure implements a second-best outcome by assigning
control to F. It is feasible if the expected return exceeds the sum of F’s opportunity cost
of investing I and management cost °, formally if Eµ[¼(xµ;µ)] ¡ I ¸ rI + °, which leads to
I · Imax. With the above contingent allocation of control, cash-ﬂow rights can be designed
to be incentive-compatibles so that the agent in control maximizes cash-ﬂows.
5 Conclusion
By endogenizing the governance system of start-ups in a stylized formalization of the investor-
entrepreneur relationship, the paper answers to the two following questions. First, why is
constraint IR°(I). It creates a discontinuity of the expected return achieved when I increases.
17That means high expected return Eµ(¼(xµ;µ)] ¡ (1 + r)I.
14control correlated with the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health? Essentially because when the start-up is
in good ﬁnancial condition, the governance system provides the entrepreneur with incentives
to maximize the project return. As the project becomes more costly, such incentives cannot
be provided. The ﬁrm is then leaded by the investor who duplicates costly management
activities to make sure to get a return on his investment. Second, why does the governance
structure assign contingent control? By assigning control and cash-ﬂow rights contingently to
the observable measure of ﬁnancial performances (here the infusion of capital), the partners
adapt the governance system to new information about expected returns.
I brieﬂy conclude with three remarks. First, the model predicts that the investor is
more likely to obtain more control as the external cost of funds increases. Indeed, simple
comparative static shows that the threshold ˜ I decreases with the interest rate r, a proxy for
the opportunity cost of capital. This is because, as funds become more costly, everything
else equal, a lower share of the expected return is devoted to the entrepreneur. This share
is therefore less likely to cover the informational rents.
Second, ﬁnancial needs are assumed here to be publicly observed by both partners. When
not observable by the ﬁnancier, the entrepreneur might be tempted to overstate her invest-
ment needs thereby enjoying private beneﬁt from extra cash. By assigning control to the
ﬁnancier for high investment levels, and thereby adding management costs, the corporate
governance structure mitigates such incentive.
Third, the paper deals with a quite general model that encompasses both ﬁnancial and
managerial decisions. Beyond the case of start-ups, it might be extended to model the evo-
lution of control on managerial decisions with the infusion of capital in others corporations,
such as business groups. It would then contribute to explain the switch of control from man-
agers to ﬁnanciers after reﬁnancing plans. This extension would require further investigation
which is beyond the scope of the paper.
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